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GETTING INTO COURT  
WHEN THE DATA HAS GOTTEN OUT:  
A TWO-PART FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late summer of 2017, headlines announcing that the personal 
information of nearly 150 million American consumers had been 
compromised shocked the conscience of the nation. Equifax, a credit 
reporting agency that compiled the personal financial information of 
consumers and sold it to businesses, had been hacked.1 During the seventy-
six days in which the hack went unnoticed by Equifax, hackers 
surreptitiously made 9,000 search queries,2 obtaining massive amounts of 
personal information including millions of consumers’ names, addresses, 
birth dates, social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and even 
credit card numbers.3 This stolen information, ranging from bank accounts 
to medical records,4 is the key to much of consumers’ financial lives. With 
it, the thieves could destroy consumers’ credit worthiness and effectively 
impersonate individuals with creditors, employers, and service providers.5 
Following the breach, a class of ninety-six consumers whose data had 
been exposed filed a complaint against Equifax in federal district court 
alleging “present, immediate, imminent, and continuing increased risk of 
harm” as a result of the breach.6 The plaintiffs claimed they were harmed 
by the burden of taking additional measures to combat identity theft and the 
increased possibility that their identity would be stolen in the future.7 
Plaintiffs alleged damages in the form of wasted time, effort, and money 
spent monitoring their credit and identity, and by the “serious and imminent 
risk of fraud and identity theft” due to the breach.8 The plaintiffs brought suit 
 
1. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says 
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytime 
s.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/5YBC-7392].  
2. Glenn Fleishman, Equifax Data Breach, One Year Later: Obvious Errors and No Real 
Changes, New Report Says, FORTUNE (Sept. 7, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/09/07/equifax-
data-breach-one-year-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/XH5Y-7T3B]. 
3. Fleishman, supra note 2. 
4. Bernard et al., supra note 1. 
5. See In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1309 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019) (describing consumer reports as “linchpins” of the nation’s financial system because of their 
central role in creditors’ decisions to extend credit). But see id. at 1314 (holding that “[t]he Plaintiffs’ 
argument that the information stolen in the Data Breach could bear on their credit worthiness is not 
persuasive”). 
6. Id. at 1309. 
7. Id. at 1311. 
8. Id.  











under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), arguing that Equifax 
unlawfully “furnished” their consumer reports to hackers and “failed to 
maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of Class 
members’ consumer reports to permitted purposes, and/or failed to take 
adequate security measures that would prevent disclosure of Class 
members’ consumer reports to unauthorized entities or computer hackers.”9 
The court, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the 
FCRA, granted Equifax’s motion to dismiss.10 The court reasoned that, 
although the FCRA does not define “furnish,” courts have held that 
information stolen by hackers is not “furnished” within the meaning of the 
FCRA.11 The plaintiffs, acknowledging this precedent, argued that Equifax 
should still be subject to liability because its “conduct was ‘so egregious’ 
that it should be considered akin to furnishing.”12 The court disregarded this 
argument, stating that the plaintiffs failed to provide discernable standards 
by which to determine when conduct was so egregious as to be considered 
furnishing.13 The court then accepted Equifax’s argument that the stolen 
information did not relate to consumers’ credit worthiness and therefore did 
not constitute a “consumer report” protected by the FCRA.14 Finally, the 
court held that because the failure to maintain reasonable procedures claim 
required Equifax to have illegally released a consumer report, that claim 
must necessarily be dismissed upon a finding that no consumer report had 
been compromised.15 
In the end, Equifax did face some consequences for its negligence. 
Though consumer attempts to hold Equifax accountable were unsuccessful, 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), along with forty-eight states, the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and the Consumer Financial 
 
9. Id. at 1312. 
10. Id. It is necessary to note that the court did not dismiss the FCRA claim for lack of standing. 
Instead, it dismissed under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), because plaintiffs failed to state a “‘plausible’ claim 
for relief” under the FCRA. Id. at 1311–14. 
11. Id. at 1312–13 (“[C]ourts generally use the term [furnish] to describe the active transmission 
of information to a third-party rather than a failure to safeguard the data.” (quoting In re Experian Data 
Breach Litig., No. SACV 15-1592 AG (DFMx), 2016 WL 7973595, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016))).  
12. Id. at 1313. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1313–14. The FCRA defines “consumer report” as: “[A]ny written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or 
mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of 
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for—(A) credit . . . ; (B) employment 
purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.” Id. at 1313 (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)). That a consumer’s private financial information—such as social security 
numbers, credit card information, date of birth, etc.—does not bear on that individual’s 
“creditworthiness” is hard to believe. A credit report is nothing more than the sum of the information it 
contains.  












Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) brought suit against Equifax to enforce 
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and other 
federal consumer protection laws.16 In July of 2019, Equifax and the FTC 
reached a settlement of nearly $700 million, whereby Equifax agreed to 
create a fund of up to $425 million to provide free credit monitoring 
services and restitution for out-of-pocket losses resulting from the breach.17 
In addition, Equifax agreed to pay $175 million in civil penalties to the 
states and a fine of $100 million to the CFPB.18 
Though $700 million seems significant, it is not enough to remedy the 
severe and varying harms caused by the breach.19 Nearly 150 million 
American consumers suffered substantial injuries including time and money 
spent securing personal accounts and consumer reports from future identity 
theft, costs of obtaining additional credit monitoring products or security 
freezes, and a vastly increased risk of falling victim to identity theft in the 
future.20 Significantly, given the nature of the information stolen, data 
thieves could wait years before utilizing the stolen data,21 causing protracted 
anxiety to millions of American consumers. 
It is hard to swallow that Equifax faced only limited liability for such 
colossal negligence. 
 
16. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Relief at 2, FTC v. Equifax, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-
03297-TWT (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint]; see CFPB, FTC and States Announce 
Settlement with Equifax over 2017 Data Breach, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 22, 2019), https:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-ftc-states-announce-settlement-with-equifax-ove 
r-2017-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/8N7B-CYTG]. The Complaint alleged violations of Section 5(a) 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which “prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce,” and the Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 314, which “requires financial institutions to protect 
the security, confidentiality, and integrity of consumer information.” Complaint, supra, at 2.  
17. Megan Leonhardt, Equifax to Pay $700 Million for Massive Data Breach. Here’s What You 
Need to Know About Getting a Cut, CNBC: MAKE IT (July 22, 2019, 9:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2 
019/07/22/what-you-need-to-know-equifax-data-breach-700-million-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/ 
JCP2-CNS7]. Although consumers can theoretically recover up to $20,000 for out-of-pocket losses 
resulting from fraud or misuse of personal information, this will be nearly impossible to establish. In 
order to recover for out-of-pocket losses, the consumer must prove a direct connection between “real 
financial loss” and the stolen data. Kate Fazzini, Proving You Deserve $20,000 from the Equifax 
Settlement Will be Nearly Impossible, CNBC (July 22, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/ 
22/equifax-reveals-details-of-671-million-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/UJB7-UF8F]. However, 
there is currently no sign of the data the hackers took. Kate Fazzini, The Great Equifax Mystery: 17 
Months Later, the Stolen Data Has Never Been Found, and Experts Are Starting to Suspect a Spy 
Scheme, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/equifax-mystery-where-i 
s-the-data.html [https://perma.cc/2P7Z-8N4Z]. It has not appeared for sale online, and according to 
experts in the field, the stolen data has not been used for identity theft, fraud, or any other purpose to 
which stolen data is typically put. Id. In fact, many data breach experts think the data is likely being put 
to a far more nefarious purpose—the identification and recruitment of American spies by foreign 
governments. Id. 
18. Leonhardt, supra note 17.  
19. See supra note 17.  
20. Complaint, supra note 16, at 14. 
21. Id. 











Because consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) such as Equifax are 
oriented to serve businesses and financial institutions, instead of the average 
person whose data they compile, they lack effective incentives to treat 
ordinary consumers, and their data, well.22 The FCRA purports to ensure 
the accuracy and privacy of information in the hands of CRAs,23 but it is 
clear from the litigation surrounding the Equifax breach and the inability of 
consumers to recover under the Act that the FCRA is no longer enough 
protection from the risks posed by online threats to poorly protected 
financial information.24 
Consumers’ right to sue under the FCRA is limited, and often times 
private litigants struggle to state a cognizable claim within the confines of 
the Act.25 Therefore, consumers do not have a truly effective avenue for 
recourse under federal law after their data has been compromised by a CRA. 
Congress should amend the FCRA to grant an explicit right of action to 
consumers seeking to vindicate data breach harms. However, such a private 
right contemplates complex problems of standing that must be resolved 
before such a private right can actually be meaningful. This Note will 
address the standing problems that would arise and propose two potential 
solutions. 
Part I of this Note will examine the history of the FCRA, the basics of 
Article III standing, and its applications to intangible harms and data-privacy 
related injuries. Part II of this Note will then propose two potential 
solutions to the standing issues that arise when consumers are granted a 
right to sue CRAs for data breach harms. First, this Note will argue that, as 
the law currently stands, the Supreme Court should recognize that data 
breaches cause particularized and concrete harms sufficient to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Finally, this Note will argue that 
because of judicial inconsistencies in applying the standing doctrine, state 
 
22. See Consumers Union, Don’t Let Equifax Put Americans at Risk Again, CONSUMER REPS. 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/data-theft/dont-let-equifax-crisis-go-to-waste-equifa 
x-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/HYH8-DYLB].  
23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 
ACT 1, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/3 
SEJ-AQGM]. 
24. Equifax is not the only company that has failed to adequately protected consumer financial 
information from breach. See, e.g., CNNMoney Staff, Target: 40 Million Credit Cards Compromised, 
CNN: BUSINESS (Dec. 19, 2013, 4:41 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/12/18/news/companies/target-
credit-card/index.html [https://perma.cc/5KH5-BZXL]; Seena Gressin, The Marriott Data Breach, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N: BLOG (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/12/marriott-data-brea 
ch [https://perma.cc/CQ2P-VVYH]; Selena Larson, Every Single Yahoo Account Was Hacked – 3 
Billion in All, CNN: BUSINESS (Oct. 4, 2017, 6:36 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/ 
business/yahoo-breach-3-billion-accounts/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6A5-597H]; Andrea Peterson, 
Adult FriendFinder Hit with One of the Biggest Data Breaches Ever, Report Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 
14, 2016, 1:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/14/adult-friendfind 
er-hit-with-one-of-the-biggest-data-breaches-ever-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/G3HT-BPT3].  












legislatures should adopt a uniform law, allowing Article III standing issues 
to be avoided altogether. 
I. THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK 
A. The History of the FCRA 
Congress enacted the FCRA to ensure that CRAs are fair, impartial, and 
respectful of consumers’ rights to privacy.26 The FCRA imposes a variety of 
responsibilities and compliance procedures on CRAs for the purpose of 
protecting consumers’ financial information from inaccuracies, exposure, 
and identity theft.27 Specifically, the FCRA requires CRAs to maintain 
“reasonable procedures” to ensure that they do not provide consumer 
reports to any person if there are “reasonable grounds” for believing that 
the report will not be used for a lawful purpose.28 The FCRA, in providing 
a uniform standard of liability, serves to protect CRAs as well as consumers 
by insulating CRAs from unpredictable liability and establishing a set of 
clear guidelines to which they can conform their behavior.29 
The FCRA intended to incentivize CRAs to incur the necessary costs of 
ensuring that consumers’ data is kept private and reported accurately.30 
However noble the FCRA’s prerogative, it lacks sufficient bite and 
enforcement power to ensure that the rights of those whom it strives to 
protect are in fact protected.31 Federal and state agencies entrusted with 
enforcement power32 often lack the resources33 to pursue all violations of the 
FRCA, and usually do not have sufficient familiarity of the facts 
underlying a claim to adequately represent consumers who have been 
 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 
27. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c-1 to -2 (requiring CRAs to take measures to insulate consumers 
from the effects of fraud and identity theft, such as blocking the reporting of credit information in a 
consumer’s file that was the result of fraud or theft); 15 U.S.C. § 1681e (requiring CRAs wishing to 
access consumer reports to identify themselves, state the purposes for which the reports will be used, 
and verify that the reports will not be used for any other purpose). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e; see also supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text. 
29. Brief of Amici Curiae Information Privacy Law Scholars in Support of Respondent at 3–17, 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) [hereinafter Spokeo Brief]. 
30. See id. at 5–6. 
31. See Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism that 
Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/30 
/technology/facebook-data-privacy-ftc.html [https://perma.cc/MP78-ZGPQ]. 
32. Federal agencies with this power include the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau. Meir Feder & Rajeev Muttreja, Understanding the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, PRACTICAL L.J., Apr./May 2016, at 48, 50.  
33. See Robbie McBeath, Can the FTC Protect Consumers in the Digital Age?, BENTON (Nov. 
30, 2018), https://www.benton.org/blog/can-ftc-protect-consumers-digital-age [https://perma.cc/58DP-
357L].  











harmed when they do decide to act.34 Thus, the responsibility to ensure that 
the act is enforced falls on the shoulders of the consumers themselves.35 As 
seen in the consumer litigation arising from the Equifax breach,36 the FCRA 
is insufficient to vindicate consumer privacy.37 An express private right of 
action will strengthen consumer protection, promote compliance with the 
FCRA, and incentivize CRAs to ensure that consumer data is well protected 
and not at risk of theft or fraud.38 However, even if such a right were to 
exist, consumers would have to overcome the substantial hurdle imposed by 
Article III’s “injury-in-fact” requirement.39 
B. Article III Standing and the Challenges of Data Breach Harms 
The United States federal government is one of limited and divided 
powers.40 Central to that principle is the requirement that the federal judicial 
power extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies,”41 justiciable within the 
limits of the United States Constitution.42 The doctrine of standing is closely 
related to the “case” or “controversy” requirement and serves to separate 
cases that are properly before the federal courts and those that are not.43 The 
standing doctrine limits the scope of the federal judicial power by 
restricting the types of litigants that are “empowered” to bring suit in 
federal court.44 The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” 
requires (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) causally connected to the conduct 
 
34. See Jessica Rich, Opinion, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth to Guard Our Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/opinion/ftc-privacy-congress.html [https://perm 
a.cc/48KN-GX23]. 
35. See Rich, supra note 34. 
36. See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra Part II. 
39. See infra Part II.A. 
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I–III; see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) 
(“[T]he Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common 
understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
42. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“[n]o principle is more 
fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation 
of federal- court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” (alteration in original) (quoting Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))). 
43. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining the doctrine of standing sets “apart the ‘Cases’ and 
‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III,” and “identif[ies] those disputes 
which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers 
principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political 
branches.”). 












complained of, that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of 
the court.45 
1. Standing and Intangible Harms 
The Supreme Court’s application of standing principles to intangible 
harms is complex, multifaceted, and often contradictory.46 Both before and 
after the seminal privacy case Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,47 the Court has been 
skeptical of plaintiffs alleging intangible injuries such as stigmatic, privacy, 
and speculative chain48 harms. Supreme Court precedent in these areas is a 
useful tool for examining the theories and processes by which the Court 
segregates the harms it deems legally cognizable within Article III from 
those it does not. 
For example, in FEC v. Akins,49 the Court held that an alleged 
infringement of a statutory right was alone sufficient to satisfy Article III 
injury-in-fact. In Akins, plaintiff-voters brought suit challenging a decision 
of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) that the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) was not a “political committee” and 
therefore was not required to make the disclosures required of organizations 
so designated.50 The FEC Act51 authorized suit by any person “aggrieved” 
by an FEC decision. The plaintiffs alleged that these disclosures would help 
them better evaluate candidates for public office, and that the deprivation of 
this information was a legally cognizable injury.52 The Court allowed 
standing.53 It reasoned that, through the enactment of the FEC Act, Congress 
statutorily created a right to information about political committees, and that 
plaintiffs were denied that information because of the FEC’s decision.54 In 
essence, the Court found an alleged infringement of the statutory right 
established by the FEC Act sufficient to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact 
requirement.55  
 
45. E.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Whitmore ex rel. Simmons v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(1990); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976). 
46. See infra notes 49–80 and accompanying text. 
47. 136 S. Ct. 1540; see infra Part I.B.2. 
48. See infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text. 
49. 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
50. Akins, 524 U.S. at 15–16. 
51. The FEC Act constitutes the bulk of U.S. campaign finance law. It places limits on campaign 
contributions to federal candidates and political parties and creates requirements for the disclosure of 
public financing. Federal Law, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., http://www.cfinst.org/law/federal.aspx [https://pe 
rma.cc/5JWY-AC5J].  
52. Akins, 524 U.S. at 16–17. 
53. Id. at 19. 
54. Id. at 20. 
55. Id. Compare id. (finding a statutory violation to be sufficient for Article III standing), with 
Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (finding that a bare statutory violation is not sufficient for 
Article III standing absent an injury-in-fact). 











The Court has thus far been reluctant to find stigma or anxiety alone to 
be a harm sufficient to establish Article III standing. In Allen v. Wright,56 
the plaintiffs, parents of Black public-school children during the 
desegregation era, sued the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) challenging 
the agency’s failure to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
private schools.57 The plaintiffs claimed that they were harmed by the 
stigmatizing effect of racial discrimination as promoted by the IRS.58 The 
Court, though sympathetic, firmly held that “abstract stigmatic injury” alone 
is not cognizable under Article III.59 Similarly, in the recent case of Trump 
v. Hawaii,60 the Court declined to consider whether stigma was sufficient to 
confer Article III standing. In Trump, the plaintiffs, United States citizens 
and permanent residents, challenged President Donald Trump’s 
proclamation that restricted entry into the United States by nationals of 
six majority Muslim countries.61 The plaintiffs argued that they had suffered 
a “claimed dignitary interest” in being free from federal religious 
establishments and the designation of a “disfavored faith”.62 The Court 
declined to decide whether this dignitary interest was adequate for Article 
III standing.63 
The Court has also declined to confer standing where the plaintiff could 
prove no more than a speculative chain of possibilities.64 In Clapper v. 
Amnesty International USA,65 a group of lawyers and human rights groups 
brought suit claiming injury under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(“FISA”).66 They alleged that, because they communicated with clients in 
areas that were heavily monitored as part of counterterrorism efforts, there 
was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would 
 
56. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
57. Id. at 743. 
58. Id. at 754. 
59. Id. at 755–56. Although the Court ultimately holds that stigma is not sufficient for Article III 
standing, it does acknowledge the very real harm that stigma causes. The Court states: “There can be no 
doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory 
government action” and even goes so far as to state that in some circumstances, stigmatic injuries may 
be sufficient to support Article III standing. Id. at 755. However, the Court specifies that stigmatic injury 
“accords a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who are personally denied equal treatment’ by the 
challenged discriminatory conduct.” Id. (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1984)). 
60. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
61. Id. at 2406. 
62. Id. at 2416. 
63. Id. The Court granted standing on other grounds, finding that the plaintiffs “assert[ed] 
another, more concrete injury: the alleged real-world effect that the Proclamation has had in keeping 
them separated from certain relatives who seek to enter the country.” Id. 
64. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013). 
65. Id. 
66. For general information on FISA, see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELEC. 












be intercepted.67 Fear of being monitored caused the plaintiffs to take costly 
measures to protect confidentiality, including frequently flying overseas to 
meet with clients instead of communicating over telephone or other 
electronic means.68 The Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
because they could not show with reasonable certainty that their 
conversations were actually being surveilled.69 The Court stated that 
plaintiffs’ claim rested on a speculative chain of possibilities, and that they 
could not show that an injury based on potential future surveillance was 
“certainly impending”70 in order to establish Article III standing. 
Significantly, the Court did not accept the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
money spent to preserve confidentiality constituted a cognizable injury 
under Article III.71 The Court held that one cannot “manufacture” standing 
based on fears of “hypothetical future harm.”72 
However, the Court’s “speculative chain of possibilities” reasoning in 
Clapper is inconsistent with other recent Supreme Court opinions. In 
Massachusetts v. EPA73 and Department of Commerce v. New York,74 the 
Court has found similarly abstract and speculative chains of reasoning 
sufficient to support standing. In Massachusetts, the State of Massachusetts 
claimed an injury resulting from the EPA’s refusal to promulgate 
greenhouse emissions standards.75 Massachusetts alleged that, as a result of 
the EPA’s failure to regulate, it was likely to lose valuable costal property 
due to global warming traceable to greenhouse gas emissions from cars and 
a consequential rise in sea levels.76 Though Massachusetts’ injury seems to 
be significantly more abstract than that alleged by the plaintiffs in Clapper, 
the Court found Article III standing to be satisfied.77 Likewise, in 
Department of Commerce, the Court again found a chain of possibilities to 
be the basis for standing in ruling that plaintiff-states could challenge the 
inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 census questionnaire.78 In 
Department of Commerce, the plaintiff states claimed that the “citizenship 
 
67. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. 
68. Id. at 401–02. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 402. 
72. Id. 
73. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
74. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
75. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23. 
76. Id. According to Massachusetts’ affidavits, global sea levels have risen between ten and 
twenty centimeters over the 20th century because of global warming. Id. at 522. 
77. Id. at 526. This injury seems highly conjectural, abstract, and attenuated. It seems quite 
unlikely that new emissions standards would actually slow global warming enough to prevent the loss 
of coastal property. However, the Court has historically given more leeway to states as plaintiffs on 
standing issues. Id. at 518–19.  
78. Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2565. 











question would result in noncitizen households responding to the census at 
lower rates than other groups, which in turn would cause them to be 
undercounted” and lead to loss of federal funds.79 The Court distinguished 
Clapper, finding that the plaintiffs theory of standing “[did] not rest on mere 
speculation” and that it “relies instead on the predictable effect of 
Government action on the decisions of third parties.”80 
2. Spokeo v. Robins and the Evolution of “Injury” 
Because data breach harms are often speculative or intangible,81 the 
injury-in-fact requirement is a significant hurdle to plaintiffs wishing to 
vindicate their rights in federal court for data breach harms.82 In Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins83 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the Article III standing 
requirements for data-privacy related cases. In Spokeo, the plaintiff, Robins, 
brought an FCRA action in federal court against Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) a 
self-proclaimed “people search engine,” for inaccurate reporting of his 
personal information.84 Robins alleged that his Spokeo profile inaccurately 
stated that he was married, had children, was in his fifties, had a job and 
a graduate degree, and was relatively wealthy.85 Robins claimed that these 
misrepresentations harmed his employment prospects because the profile 
made him seem overqualified for jobs he may have otherwise been offered, 
“expectant of a higher salary than employers would be willing to pay,” and 
“less mobile because of family responsibilities.”86 
The district court found that Robins lacked standing and dismissed his 
complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that he had 
alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III.87 The Supreme Court 
 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 2566. 
81. Examples of harms that might arise from data breaches include the risk of pecuniary loss 
resulting from potential fraud/identity theft, preventative measures to protect against risk of future 
pecuniary loss, invasion of privacy, and anxiety and emotional distress. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle 
Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018); Elizabeth 
C. Pritzker, Making the Intangible Concrete: Litigating Intangible Privacy Harms in a Post-Spokeo 
World, 26 COMPETITION 1 (2017); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
82. See infra Part II.A. 
83. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
84. Id. at 1544. Spokeo is a searchable, yellow-pages-like website that allows curious individuals 
to input a person’s name, phone number, or email address and view a report of their personal information 
compiled from a variety of databases. Id. Upon running a search for my own name, Spokeo provided me 
with a wealth of information about myself—my address, my parents’ addresses, my approximate 
income, my level of education, and my general consumer tendencies. 
85. Id. at 1546. 
86. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
87. Id. at 1544 (majority opinion). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Robins had alleged a violation 
of his own statutory rights and that he had an individualized, rather than collective, interest in his own 












of the United States reversed, finding that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied 
the standing doctrine, and outlined what was to become the current state of 
the injury-in-fact requirement in data-privacy scenarios.88 
The Court emphasized the importance of injury-in-fact to the standing 
doctrine and the larger policy of separation of powers.89 Specifically, the 
Court made clear that injury-in-fact is an “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” that cannot be erased or legislated away by a congressional grant 
of a right to sue, given through statute, to a plaintiff who would otherwise 
not satisfy the requirements to get into federal court.90 The Court then 
articulated that injury-in-fact requires an “invasion of a legally protected 
interest” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.”91 The Court states that a particularized harm 
is one that affects the plaintiff in a “personal and individual way.”92 
Elaborating, the Court states that a harm must be not only particularized, but 
concrete, and that concreteness is a requirement distinct from 
particularization.93 The Court states that a concrete injury is one that 
“actually exist[s],” and is real, rather than abstract.94 However, the Court 
specifies that concrete injuries need not be tangible in the traditional sense. 
In fact, the Court outlines two factors to consider when determining whether 
an intangible harm constitutes an “injury-in-fact”: 1) whether the alleged 
intangible harm has a “close relationship to a harm that has traditionally 
been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American 
courts” and 2) whether Congress intended the harm to meet Article III 
requirements.95 The Court acknowledges that Congress has the power to 
elevate by statute “legally cognizable injuries” that were not previously 
recognized at law.96 But these harms must still meet the minimum 
requirements mandated by Article III, and Congress cannot legislate 
standing where it would otherwise not exist.97 In other words, bare statutory 
 
88. See id. at 1545. 
89. Id. at 1546–50; see supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
90. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–48. 
91. Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
92. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). 
93. Id. According to the Court, it is here that the Ninth’s Circuit’s analysis went astray. The Court 
finds that the Ninth Circuit “elided” the concreteness with particularization, stating that Robins’ injury 
was sufficiently concrete when it was in fact only particularized. Id. 
94. Id. The Court also notes that Congress is not restricted from, by statute, “elevat[ing] to the 
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” 
Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). But these intangible harms must still satisfy the minimum 
requirements of Article III. Id.  
95. Id. at 1549.  
96. Id.; see supra note 94. 
97. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; supra note 94. 











violations, without a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, do not 
confer standing.98 
The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had not fully appreciated 
“concreteness” as a discrete element of injury-in-fact and remanded for a 
determination of whether or not Robbins had alleged a sufficiently concrete 
and particularized injury.99 Though the Court admits that Congress enacted 
the FCRA in part to minimize the dissemination of false information by 
adopting procedures to decrease that risk, a mere violation of those 
procedures does not necessarily create the type of harm that is legally 
cognizable under Article III.100 Significantly, the Court states that a 
“violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no 
harm,” and not all inaccuracies, like those affecting Robins, cause the type 
of harm that can give rise to standing in federal court.101 
II. FACILITATING A PRIVATE RIGHT: THE SUPREME COURT OR THE STATES? 
Consumer protection laws, such as the FCRA, can only be effective if 
victimized consumers are allowed to vindicate their own rights in court. 
Because private individuals largely cannot bring suit under the FCRA, 
injuries caused by consumer privacy violations are often left unredressed.102 
The following Part of this Note will first outline the merits of a private right 
of action and argue that a such a right should be expressly conferred by 
Congress. However, the gift or implication of a private right of action is 
itself a solution that raises the primary issue this Note seeks to address: 
standing. Given the current state of the standing doctrine as it pertains to 
intangible harms post-Spokeo,103 it is unlikely that the federal courts would 
actually reach the merits of many data privacy cases even if these cases were 
brought by the consumers themselves. Therefore, the remainder of this Note 
will first argue that the Supreme Court should recognize that the harms 
caused by data breaches are sufficiently “particularized” and “concrete.” 
Then, this Note will explore an alternative solution to the standing problem 
 
98. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s holding in Akins with its 
holding in Spokeo less than twenty years later. In Akins, the plaintiffs were alleging an intangible harm—
lack of information—that arose by virtue of a mere statutory violation. Likewise, in Spokeo, the plaintiff 
alleged a procedural violation of the FCRA. It seems nonsensical to consider the harm in Akins to be 
any more “concrete” than that alleged in Spokeo. 
99. Id. at 1550. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. The Court provides several examples to illustrate this point: (1) “[E]ven if a consumer 
reporting agency fails to provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that 
information regardless may be entirely accurate,” and (2) “An example that comes readily to mind is an 
incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without 
more, could work any concrete harm.” Id. 
102. See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 












and argue that, given the inconsistencies of federal court standing 
jurisprudence, a uniform state law granting consumers a private right of 
action should be considered. 
Enforcement of the FRCA and other federal statutes intended to promote 
consumer protection have largely been left to federal agencies.104 In 
particular, the FTC is primarily responsible for the administration of 
consumer protection laws such as the FTC Act and the FCRA.105 However, 
though the FTC rigorously attempts to enforce data and consumer privacy 
legislation, its power is not unlimited. Federal agencies often lack the 
resources necessary to prosecute all, or even most, violations of its rules.106 
On the other hand, many benefits emerge when private citizens are 
allowed to vindicate their own rights under federal law. For example, 
private enforcement increases prosecutorial resources and conserves federal 
funds by allowing agencies to focus their enforcement efforts on violations 
that don’t incentivize private litigants to sue.107 Additionally, private 
litigants are better equipped with the information necessary to effectively 
vindicate the harms they personally suffered.108 Also, private enforcement 
encourages legal innovation because private litigants are more likely than 
agency prosecutors to push for expansions in liability and the development 
of new legal standards that push the envelope of administrative regulatory 
policies.109 Further, the decentralized nature of private litigation promotes 
innovation by allowing district judges to experiment with a number of 
various policy solutions to widespread issues.110 In this way, courts can act 
as laboratories of democracy by developing common law ideals that, if 
effective, can grow to national prominence. Finally, consumer enforcement 
 
104. The FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection is the arm of the FTC that “stops unfair, deceptive 
and fraudulent business practices by: collecting complaints and conducting investigations, suing 
companies and people that break the law, developing rules to maintain a fair marketplace, [and] 
educating consumers and businesses about their rights and responsibilities.” About the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-con 
sumer-protection/about-bureau-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc/2S8G-ZEKJ]. 
105. Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement [https://perma.cc/DV 
X9-HBT7]. 
106. Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a Yes-No Proposition in Federal US 





107. Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 637, 662–63 (2013). 
108. Id. “[T]he massive governmental expenditures required to detect and investigate misconduct 
are no match for the millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ that bear witness to . . . violations.” Id. at 664 
(omission in original) (quoting Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing 
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1413 (2000)). 
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reduces the uncertainty that inevitably results when enforcement power is 
left entirely to administrative agencies.111 
Though the benefits of a private right of action are clear,112 the standing 
doctrine as currently applied to data breach harms effectively prevents the 
federal courts from reaching the merits of these cases even if such a private 
right were available. Therefore, the Supreme Court should reconceptualize 
harms faced by data breach victims as particularized and concrete, and 
therefore within the parameters of federal standing doctrines. 
A. Court’s Solution: Data Breaches Cause Particularized and Concrete 
Harms Sufficient to Satisfy Art. III 
The standing doctrine, while fundamental to the federal court system, is 
imperfect. It is applied inconsistently by the Supreme Court113 and is 
oftentimes used as a mechanism for avoiding the merits of contentious 
cases. In addition, many injuries that are not legally cognizable under the 
standing doctrine do in fact produce real world harms that should be 
recognized by the federal courts.114 Data breach harms are one such 
example. As discussed above, consumers who’ve been victimized by data 
breaches often suffer very real injuries such as emotional distress, anxiety, 
and pecuniary losses. But because the federal courts by and large refuse to 
reach the merits of these claims, private plaintiffs wishing to vindicate their 
rights would likely be unable to successfully bring suit in federal court, even 
if such a right of action were to be granted by congress.115 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court should recognize intangible injuries caused by data breaches 
to be legally cognizable, and thereby pave the road for consumers to 
vindicate their harms in federal court. 
In the years following the Spokeo decision, the Supreme Court has yet to 
clarify how the standing test in Spokeo is to be satisfied.116 Therefore, the 
lower courts have applied the test in a widely divergent manner. For 
example, in Strubel v. Comenity Bank,117 the Second Circuit held that an 
“alleged procedural violation can by itself manifest concrete injury where 
Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete 
interests and where the procedural violation presents a ‘risk of real harm’ to 
 
111. Id. at 664–65. 
112. See e.g., id. at 662–66; Jerome, supra note 106. 
113. See supra Part I.B.1. 
114. See Solove & Citron, supra note 81; Pritzker, supra note 81; see also supra note 17. 
115. See Solove & Citron, supra note 81; Pritzker, supra note 81. 
116. See Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019) (remanding to the district court for factual 
determination of whether or not the Spokeo test was satisfied without clarifying how that test was to be 
applied). 












that concrete interest.”118 The Third Circuit similarly applied Spokeo in In re 
Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation,119 finding that “injury-in-fact 
‘may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.’”120 
Significantly, many lower courts have found that data breaches pose a 
concrete and particularized risk of harm that is sufficient to satisfy Article 
III. For example, the court in Boone v. T-Mobile USA Inc.,121 boldly asserted 
that “[p]rivacy violations can give rise to standing.”122 Specifically, the 
Boone court found the mere unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information alone to be a concrete injury within the meaning of Spokeo and 
Article III.123 To do so, the court in Boone relied on language from the 
Supreme Court in Spokeo itself: that an intangible injury is nevertheless 
concrete if it “has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”124 
The court then analogized the harms posed by privacy violations to those 
created by libel and slander, noting that “victims of slander and libel have 
long been permitted recovery even through their harms are often difficult to 
prove or measure.”125 The Boone court then stated that “[t]he FCRA 
elevates this harm [posed by privacy violations] to a statutory right and 
establishes that ‘the unauthorized dissemination of personal information by 
a credit reporting agency causes an injury in and of itself—whether or not 
the disclosure of that information increased the risk of identity theft or some 
other future harm.’”126 Further, one court has found emotional distress 
caused by a violation of the FCRA to be sufficient injury for federal 
standing.127 In Larson v. Trans Union, LLC,128 the district court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in FEC v. Akins,129 finding that the plaintiff 
suffered an “informational” injury, and not a “bare procedural violation” 
when defendant Trans Union provided him with a credit report containing 
 
118. Id. at 190 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
119. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). 
120. Id. at 273 (quoting In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 
134 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
121. Civ. No. 17-378-KM-MAH, 2018 WL 588927, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2018). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at *7 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
125. Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). The Boone court further states that “‘unauthorized 
disclosures of information’ have long been seen as injurious” and argues that unauthorized disclosure is 
significantly similar to invasion of privacy torts that have traditionally provided a cause of action in 
English and American tort law. Id. at *8 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. 
Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
126. Id. at *8 (quoting In re Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 639). 
127. Larson v. Trans Union, LLC, 201 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
128. Id. 
129. 524 U.S. 11 (1998); see supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. 











misleading information.130 Significantly, the court related the emotional 
distress suffered by the plaintiff to the “uncertainty” surrounding the state 
of his credit report and personal financial information.131 This connection—
that uncertainty can cause a kind of emotional distress legally cognizable by 
the federal courts—is a foundational peg on which the hat of cognizable data 
breach harms can be hung. 
The Sixth Circuit has even recognized the increased risk of identity theft 
as legally cognizable.132 For example, in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance133 the plaintiff class brought suit against Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance for negligently allowing their personal data to be exposed by 
hackers.134 Significantly, the court eschewed the limitation seemingly 
imposed by Clapper v. Amnesty International USA135 that allegations of 
“possible” future injury are insufficient. In contrast, the Galaria court 
boldly found that plaintiff suffered a “substantial risk” of harm in addition 
to “reasonably incurred mitigation costs,” and that these injuries, though 
indeterminate, were sufficient for Article III standing.136 This holding, 
though set out in an unpublished opinion, establishes a framework for 
recognizing as legally cognizable the types of harms suffered by data breach 
victims.  
It is not enough that several remote courts have allowed standing for data 
breach harms. Every consumer across the nation whose data has been 
exposed deserves the comfort of knowing that there is a federal court in 
which their claims can be brought, and the assurance of knowing that the 
merits of their cases will be heard. The Supreme Court should, when given 
the chance, build on the holdings of these few and brave lower courts to 
hold that anxiety, emotional distress, and the pecuniary losses incurred 
through “mitigation costs” are sufficiently concrete and particularized to 
give rise to federal standing. 
B. Legislatures’ Solution: The United States Should Adopt a Uniform 
State Law Mirroring the CCPA. 
The above proposal contemplates the role of the federal courts in creating 
an avenue by which data breach victims can uphold their rights. However, 
given the observed inconsistencies in the federal courts’ application of 
standing doctrine, the federal courts are an inadequate safeguard for 
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131. Id. at 1108. 
132. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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134. Id. at 385. 
135. 568 U.S. 398 (2013); see supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text. 












individual rights in the data breach context. Because state courts are not 
bound by Article III, the state legislatures should adopt a uniform state law 
authorizing a private right of action for data breach harms. 
Since 1892, states have elected to adopt uniform state laws on issues of 
national importance.137 These laws are intended to “minimize conflicts of 
law” between the states and offer alternatives to the “nationalization of 
law . . . by the [federal] government.”138 Uniform state laws are proposed by 
the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”),139 an organization created by the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”), for the purpose of determining which 
areas of the law are ripe for unification, and drafting and proposing 
legislation in those areas.140 Because of the increasingly interdependent 
nature of the national economy, uniform state laws are becoming necessary 
to facilitate national commercial policies, promote economic and social 
development, and provide certainty among the states.141 For example, 
variability in state commercial law would create an administrative nightmare 
for large corporations,142 and could potentially hinder nationwide economic 
growth.143 
 
137. See Robert Stein, Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the United 
States, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2253, 2255–57; Kim Quaile Hill & Patricia A. Hurley, Uniform State Law 
Adoptions in the American States: An Explanatory Analysis, PUBLIUS, Winter 1988, at 117, 117. 
138. Hill & Hurley, supra note 140, at 117. The “states’ rights” rational for adoption of uniform 
laws is interesting: “[A] state which unites with other states in framing such general and uniform laws 
in matters affecting the common interests of all the states, and in the spirit of mutual compromise, 
through mutual commissions and investigations, yields, in so doing, nothing whatever of its state 
sovereignty. On the contrary, the proposed method of voluntary state action takes from the general 
government any excuse for absorbing powers now confined to the states, and therefore directly tends to 
preserve intact the independence of the states.” Id. at 119 (alteration in original) (quoting Paul L. Wilbert, 
Uniform State Law: An Instrument for Preserving State Integrity and Sovereignty, 49 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 
341, 346 (1980)). 
139. Prior to 2008, the ULC was known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws. Richard B. Long, Uniform State Laws: Where Do They Come from and Why Do They 
Matter?, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Apr. 2019, at 32, 33. 
140. Hill & Hurley, supra note 140, at 117–19. Since its inception in 1892, the ULC has drafted 
more than 250 uniform laws. Stein, supra note 140. 
141. See Stein, supra note 140, at 2264–65, 2271. 
142. Id.; Joshua Gutter & Carlton Fields, The Imitation Game: How the CCPA Is Inspiring Other 
States to Regulate Consumer Data and Online Privacy, JD SUPRA (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.jdsupra. 
com/legalnews/the-imitation-game-how-the-ccpa-is-81376/ [https://perma.cc/ST6P-DV3X]. Gutter and 
Fields emphasize the necessity of uniformity in data privacy laws and liability as more states adopt 
nuanced consumer data and online privacy laws. Id. 
143. See Hill & Hurley, supra note 140, at 118–19; see also Stein, supra note 140, at 2253 (“In 
order for state law to be a viable alternative to federal law on issues as to which uniformity is desirable, 
it is essential that state law be uniform from state to state.”). 











1. State Standing Principles 
Given that Article III poses a stringent limitation on bringing data 
privacy cases in the federal courts,144 this problem is especially suited for 
uniform state legislation. State courts are not bound by the same 
Constitutional restrictions on jurisdiction as are the federal courts.145 This 
means that states are free to formulate their own standing doctrines and have 
the liberty to allow cases into state court that would otherwise not be 
justiciable in federal court. Though states are not required to follow the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the majority of states have in fact 
adopted standing doctrines similar to, or derived from, the “case” or 
“controversy” requirement of Article III.146 However, only a minority of 
those states following Article III have adopted the limitations outlined in 
Lujan,147 and even those that do recognize such limitations allow for 
exceptions.148 Therefore, though the fifty states boast widely differing 
standing doctrines, in general, they are less demanding than those 
limitations imposed by the federal Constitution.149 
a. How States and the EU Handle Data Breach Claims 
Though oftentimes the law is slow to catch up with the ever-changing 
advances in technology, the European Union’s (“EU”) enactment of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) heavily influenced the 
global political economy and its views on data privacy regulations.150 While 
technically the GDPR only effects the EU—only EU citizens benefit from 
the rights conferred by the Act151—U.S. companies that have a web 
 
144. See supra Part I.B. 
145. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he special 
limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not 
binding on the state courts.”). 
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& NAT. RES. L. 349, 349–53 (2015). 
147.  See supra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
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149. See id. at 349–53. 
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before collection of personal data and explain how that data is used. It gives consumers the right to ask 
how their data is being collected and stored and the ability to require that personal data be deleted. Arielle 













presence in the EU will be required to comply with its regulations.152 In 
response to the GDPR, California enacted its own formulation of the EU’s 
comprehensive data privacy standards and several other states followed 
suit.153 
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) went into effect on 
January 1, 2020.154 The CCPA is the first state-wide, comprehensive, data-
privacy act, and it reflects many of the police and regulatory imperatives of 
the EU’s GDPR.155 The CCPA contains extensive data privacy regulations 
with the purpose of accomplishing three significant data privacy goals: 1) 
consumers will have the right to know what information is being collected 
about them by corporations, 2) consumers will have the right to tell data-
collecting corporations not to share and sell their personal information, and 
3) consumers will be protected against businesses that do not value consumer 
privacy.156 Similar to the way the GDPR affects U.S. businesses operating 
in the EU, the CCPA likewise applies to out-of-state, for-profit corporations 
that collect and control the personal information of California residents, do 
business in the state of California, and meet certain financial 
requirements.157 
In contrast to the FCRA, which does not allow a private right of action 
for consumers seeking to vindicate data breach injuries,158 the CCPA breaks 
new ground by facilitating consumer suits following data breach harms.159 
 
ired.com/story/how-gdpr-affects-you/ [https://perma.cc/9J39-HAP7]. Furthermore, “personal data” is 
widely defined to include not only a consumer’s name, email, and IP address, but also “pseudonymized 
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153. See infra Figure 1: State Privacy Legislation Comparison Chart. 
154. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don’t Sell My Data! We Finally Have a Law for That, WASH. POST: 
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Because data breach harms often come in difficult-to-quantify forms such 
as anxiety and preventative measures,160 compensatory damages can be 
insufficient to make whole consumers whose data has been exposed. The 
CCPA provides for a limited private right of action following data 
breaches.161 Significantly, this private right allows for statutory damages, 
relieving would-be plaintiffs of the often prohibitive burden of showing 
damages.162 Because the CCPA guarantees a statutory award of between 
$100 and $750,163 plaintiffs and their lawyers are more inclined to bring suit 
following data breaches, thereby holding corporations to account for their 
misuse, or poor protection of, private personal information.164 In addition to 
the availability of statutory damages, consumers can request declaratory or 
injunctive relief following a data breach.165 
California’s enactment of the CCPA is indicative of a growing trend 
favoring strict state data privacy legislation.166 Eighteen states, not 
including California, have introduced bills or initiated taskforces to 
overhaul state consumer privacy policies and regulations.167 Two of these 
states, Maine and Nevada, have passed into law their own comprehensive 
data privacy acts.168 
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Maine’s Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information 
(“PPOCI”) is stricter than the CCPA in some ways and far more lenient in 
others.169 While the CCPA protects all California residents, even those 
physically outside of the state, the Maine PPOCI only benefits those Maine 
citizens who are physically inside of the state of Maine and who are billed 
for broadband services received in Maine.170 In addition, while the CCPA 
applies broadly to many out-of-state corporations that do business in 
California, only those broadband internet access services operating in Maine 
must comply with the PPOCI.171 Significantly, the PPOCI does not specify 
how its regulations are to be enforced.172 Though an amendment placing 
enforcement authority in the hands of the Maine Attorney General was 
introduced, that amendment did not pass.173 Additionally, unlike the CCPA, 
the act does not authorize enforcement suits by private consumers.174 
Because it is unknown how the law will be enforced, the extent of its impact 
on consumer privacy in Maine and nationwide is unclear. However, should 
a Maine court read the act as authorizing a private right of action,175 the 
PPOCI, like the CCPA would take a notable step towards protecting 
Americans’ private information from data breaches and corporate 
malfeasance.176 
Similarly, Massachusetts has introduced an expansive bill that would 
provide strong privacy protections for its consumers.177 This bill would 
provide Massachusetts consumers the broadest privacy protections in the 
country.178 For example, the bill inclusively defines “personal information” 
to cover “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
consumer,”179 and goes as far as to apply, not only to online identifying 
information, but also to “an individual’s physiological, biological or 
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behavioral characteristics.”180 Massachusetts’ proposed bill would grant 
consumers a private right of action to enforce these regulations.181 This right 
carries large statutory remedies and does not require that the consumer-
plaintiff show actual injury to establish standing.182 The bill specifies that 
“[a] violation of this chapter shall constitute an injury in fact to the consumer 
who has suffered the violation, and the consumer need not suffer a loss of 
money or property as a result of the violation in order to bring an action for 
a violation of this chapter.”183 Under federal law, a statutory violation alone 
has generally been found insufficient to establish standing.184 However, due 
to Massachusetts’ more lenient standing requirements,185 it is possible for the 
state to introduce such innovative legislation. Though Massachusetts’ data 
privacy bill may never be signed into law, it exemplifies the kinds of 
legislative reforms that states can enact where the federal government is 
incapable, or unwilling, to regulate. 
That the above states are contemplating passing, or have passed, vastly 
differing data privacy standards into law is telling. Should this pattern 
continue, it is possible that each of the fifty states could adopt their own 
unique legislation, causing confusion and inefficiency for businesses that 
operate on a national scale.186 Businesses and industry groups are not 
unaware of the risks posed by a patchwork of differing state privacy laws.187 
Varying state consumer protection laws create a compliance nightmare for 
businesses that operate online across state lines.188 For example, though 
Nevada and California share a border and a thriving interstate market, both 
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states recently passed new privacy legislation that imposes different 
standards, such as when a consumer can opt out of having personal data 
sold.189 These inconsistencies significantly raise compliance costs on 
businesses who operate, or even sell products or services in the interstate 
market.190 
In addition, patchwork state privacy laws pose the added risk of giving 
consumers a false sense of security that their data is being protected. 
Journalist Michael Beckerman provides an illustrative example: “[A] 
California woman who orders an item from a Missouri business that 
manufactures in Florida could have her data regulated by three separate 
laws, or by no applicable law.”191 Consumers who interact with out-of-state 
businesses online have no way of knowing whether or not their personal 
data is being protected or which state’s privacy laws, if any, will apply.192 
A uniform state law would solve many of the problems this Note has 
raised. It would ensure consistent compliance standards among the states, 
while providing a regulatory framework in place to protect consumer’s 
private data. In addition, states can venture where it seems the federal courts 
may not: a uniform state law could provide a private right of action so that 
citizens across the nation could take ownership of their rights to privacy and 
vindicate those rights on their own behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has proposed two solutions to the standing issues that surround 
the implementation of a private right of action for data breach harms. Both 
solutions have their virtues and their drawbacks, and this Note does not claim 
that one solution is more preferable than the other. However, as businesses 
and social relationships increasingly become features of an online world, it 
is important that the injuries that accrue from our online lives are seen for 
what they are. Certainly anxiety, emotional distress, pecuniary loss, and 
increased risk of future identity theft are injuries that “actually exist.” It is 
simply a question as to how these injuries will be recognized and by whom.  
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